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Abstract: Classically, humans have been perceived as a source of faults in systems. 
Modern ergonomic views are promoting a somewhat different idea according to which 
humans are a factor of safety in unexpected situations. The safety of a system cannot be 
achieved without taking into account these two sides of cognition which compose what 
is called cognitive flexibility. In this paper, we will consider the cases of a nuclear 
accident and a plane crash-landing where human cognitive flexibility has impacted on the 
final safety of the system. We aim to discuss the violations that humans have performed 
in these cases with the assumption that they do not always deteriorate system safety. The 
discussion gravitates around a core argument according to which violations per se do not 
inform on the safety impairments in a system. Some other dimensions have to be taken 
into account. Among these, we are of the opinion that the accuracy of the operators’ 
mental model plays a key role, allowing some violations to improve system safety in 
emergency situations. 
Keywords: Large-scale systems safety, cognitive ergonomics, violations. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Due to the increase of critical functions allocated to automatic agents (e.g. computers), 
the safety of socio-technical systems is an area where the stakes are continuously being 
raised. But reducing these systems down to a set of pure technical components would 
discard a very hot topic: deterministic automatic agents cohabit with non-deterministic 
human agents. As the actions of the latter can impact very strongly on the final safety of 
any system where they are present, it is worth questioning ourselves about the integration 
of humans into socio-technical systems. After Reason (1990; 1997), it is believed here 
that a combination of organisational arguments added to the identification of local 
individual factors offers an interesting analytical framework for discussing human 
actions. As our objective for this paper is analysing the impact of violations, we will look 
at system safety by linking the local individual cognitive components of actions to the 
organisational context in which they are embedded. 
According to Reason (1990), violations can be seen as deliberate actions that deviate 
from the practices that designers and regulators have defined as necessary. The position 
defended here promotes that violations performed by humans at work are too often seen 
as generators of accidents. We will therefore emphasise a somewhat different view 
according to which violations can have a positive impact on system safety (Reason, 
1997). We will discuss violations in rather neutral terms, as an expression of human 
cognitive flexibility. In the following section (section  2), we will present some classical 
concepts related to the role of regulators played by humans in systems. We will then 
come to the core of the paper and will consider violations (section  3). Precisely, we will 
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expose two case studies that shed some light on two opposite facets of violations, namely 
their contribution to impairing or enhancing system safety. The case studies will call for a 
careful discussion (section  4) where we suggest that the violations and the mental model 
held by the operators have to be considered together, along with the liberty that 
violations allow on the system’s configuration. This position will drive our set of 
recommendations (section  5). 
2 HUMANS AS COGNITIVE AGENTS IN SYSTEMS 
Research in cognitive psychology made a big step forward by quantifying the limits of 
human memory and reasoning capacities. Important breakthroughs comprise the limits 
of short-term memory (Miller, 1956), goal and sub-goal decomposition (see the General 
Problem Solver by Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1957), reasoning biases when solving logical 
problems (Wason, 1966) and expert memory (Chase & Simon, 1973). From this 
fundamental work, a whole trend of research emerged in the 1980s which focussed on 
the human factors in the workplace. It then quickly became obvious that there was a 
need for zooming out from purely individual issues in order to encompass the 
complexity of the environment in which individuals act. A new approach named cognitive 
ergonomics then became targeted at understanding cognitive acts in the workplace, 
eventually exploring humans’ potential contribution to system safety. 
In the cognitive ergonomics’ view, the information processing modes that humans 
implement at work are based on heuristic short-cuts built on top of the experience 
acquired through a life-long dynamic interaction with a diverse and changing 
environment. The resulting processing mode prioritises a trade-off between saving 
cognitive resources and perfect responses to the environment. This trade-off covers a 
very wide continuum that allows some room for errors and imperfections. However 
unsuitable to critical processes it may appear, this information processing strategy 
provides the flexibility that is required to perform and control uncertain actions in 
response to unknown problems. In the cognitive ergonomics conception, humans are no 
longer regarded as static components of a system. They are conceived as agents 
dedicating their mental resources to adapting themselves to varying environments, 
dealing with unknown situations and, as a result, contributing to system safety.  
2.1 Mental models 
When they interact with a system, humans need to understand what is currently 
happening and what is likely to happen next (Sarter & Woods, 1995). For this reason, 
they maintain a mental representation of the various ongoing and expected processes in a 
system. This representation is called a mental model. However, humans’ memory and 
processing capacities have limits. Consequently, mental models are incomplete 
representations of reality. They are fed by a) a portion of the knowledge held about the 
system and updated by b) a selection of the data available in the environment. The 
selection is driven by the objectives that the operators have in the system (Rasmussen, 
1986). For instance, aircraft maintenance crews operate on a different set of data than 
pilots, although both are actors in the same system. Thus mental models must be seen as 
incomplete, dynamic, goal-driven representations of reality (Ochanine, 1978) which 
partially reflect the system acted upon (Moray, 1987). 
When they are adapted to a given situation, mental models contain the knowledge that is 
necessary to conduct an interaction, and data extracted from the environment. Via a 
proper updating process, valid mental models allow goals to be achieved in a pro-active 
manner. This is crucial in a dynamic system because its future states and the 
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consequences of one’s actions are then anticipated, allowing operators to stay in step 
with the process they interact with. 
Needless to say however, in today’s extremely complex automated systems, humans can 
have incorrect mental models because of e.g. incomplete or erroneous knowledge, high 
pace of data flow, time pressure, etc. Moreover, incorrect models are not always detected 
as such by operators. Revision can be impaired by such mechanisms as fixation errors 
(De Keyser & Woods, 1990). 
2.2 Control modes 
Mental models are a concept depicting how humans represent the world. They determine 
the goals set by the operators and which actions will be performed to reach these goals. 
How the actions are actually selected, planned and executed depends on the control 
mode. The general assumption is that the more familiar a situation, the more likely it is 
that operators will rely on a skill-based mode of control. Conversely, the less familiar a 
situation, the more likely it is that operators will rely on a knowledge-based mode of 
control. Half-way between these two modes lies a third rule-based one (Rasmussen, 
1986). We will not enter into very deep details about this well-known theoretical 
framework. Rather, our purpose is to emphasise that the familiarity of a given problem 
will call for a certain category of solution strategy. Precisely, routine problems call for 
shortcuts and heuristics. Such problems are dealt with in terms of a quick response to 
environmental signals (e.g. solving an over-heating problem by choosing the right gauges 
to read and triggering the right set of actions) with a very low mental load. Therefore, we 
will associate routine situations to the skill-based mode of control. On the contrary, some 
understanding has to be built for new or exceptional problems. In this case, the operator 
has to resort to a more declarative form of knowledge. In this case, the operator is said to 
treat the information as symbols feeding an inferential, costly, knowledge-based control 
mode. 
The control modes are not exclusive from one another: they cohabit at all times. Only 
the proportion of the activity controlled under one mode or the other varies. Therefore, 
it is by pure simplification that a) we will rely on only two of them and that b) we will 
treat them as discrete notions. 
 
Although it is not the only mechanism for it, the so-called flexible reasoning is supported 
by mental models and control modes that dynamically shape the interaction with the 
world. These two concepts will be used in the discussion of the two cases described in 
sections  3.1 and  3.2. So far, we have only relied on the well-known ideas that humans are 
a central component in systems’ safety and that their activity is controlled by a potentially 
incomplete mental representation of reality. This is the standpoint from which we will 
investigate violations. We will claim that when reasoning about the safety of one’s acts, 
the operators’ intentions and how they address the constraints on a given situation have 
to be considered. Our purpose will be to defend that violations do not systematically lead 
to undesired events. When they are coupled with a valid mental model, they can ensure 
or even increase the safety level of a system. The following sections of this paper will aim 
at exposing this dual view. 
3 VIOLATIONS 
Violations have been mentioned or studied in a wide variety of contexts including car 
driving (Blockey & Hartley, 1995; Parker et al., 1995; Aberg & Rimmo, 1998), aircraft 
piloting (Air France, 1997), large-scale accidents (Reason, 1990) computer programming 
(Soloway et al., 1988) and bureaucratic environments (Damania, 2001). They are actions 
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that intentionally break procedures (Reason, 1987; Parker et al., 1995), usually aiming at 
easing the execution of a given task. They may reveal the existence of faulty 
organisational settings when they are the only way to get the work done (Air France, 
1997). In this latter case, these violations are the result of latent organisational factors 
leading to the rules or procedures being broken in order to accomplish a given task. 
These latent factors are usually implemented by actors who are remote (i.e. managers) 
from the resulting risks (Reason, 1995). 
Reason (1990) distinguishes between several categories of violations. For the scope of 
our paper, we will focus on one dimension, namely routine violations as opposed to 
exceptional violations. The first type happens when an operator or a team regularly 
achieves a set of objectives by means which differ from prescribed procedures. In this 
case, the violation is often so deeply embedded into the daily practice that it is no longer 
identified as an illegal act. Such elements as following the path of least effort, managerial 
laissez-faire and badly designed procedures are contributing factors. The second category 
of violations (exceptional violations) happens when an operator or a team is performing 
an action in a context identified as a non-routine one, requiring some intentional 
departure from the prescribed practice. The objective may be to solve a problem that is 
not identified by the procedures. The cases depicted in the sections  3.1 and  3.2 
respectively are instances of theses two types of violations. 
 
As we stated previously, violations must not be directly associated with accidents. The 
latter take more than violations to happen: they have to be combined with errors. After 
Hollnagel (1993; see this author for a review of various classifications of errors), we see 
errors as a behaviour (or knowledge) that fails to produce the expected results and that 
may lead to unwanted consequences. Errors differ from violations in that the latter are 
merely behaviours that depart from some form of prescription (procedure, manual, rule, 
etc.) without necessarily leading to unwanted consequences. However, violations typically 
create specific unprotected conditions where recovering from or compensating for an 
error may no longer be possible. Major accidents in large-scale systems exhibit this 
combination (see for instance Gitus, 1988, about the Chernobyl accident), which is 
rooted in a variety of cultural, managerial and organisational factors (Cacciabue, 2000). In 
the following sub-sections, we will defend the idea that violations, under some 
conditions, can enhance system safety. Because we will analyse this as a cognitive 
phenomenon, we will account for the role played by mental models in the correctness of 
illegal actions. Our position is that without a correct mental model of a task and of the 
future system’s states, violations can lead to accidents. On the other hand, a correct 
mental model may allow one to carry out safe departures from the rules, in emergency 
conditions for instance. It is this cognitive angle that we investigate in this paper, by 
focussing on the psychological aspects of systems’ safety.  
This position will be built upon two opposite case studies providing instances of routine 
and exceptional violations, respectively. The first case will depict an accident in a nuclear 
fuel processing plant in 1999, in Tokaimura, Japan. With this case, we will expose the 
harmful side of violations. We will oppose it with what we call desirable violations with the 
case of the crash-landing of a DC-10 in 1989, in Sioux City, Iowa, USA. However 
misleading the presentation of the cases may seem, we wish to make clear that our 
purpose is not to treat routine and exceptional violations as being respectively harmful 
and desirable. Surely, many examples of safe routine violations (e.g. successful adaptation 
of badly designed procedures) and dangerous exceptional violations (e.g. driving on the 
hard shoulder of the motorway to arrive on-time) exist. 
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3.1 Harmful violations: The Tokaimura criticality accident 
There is a limited amount of uranium that can be put together without initiating fission. 
When this critical mass is exceeded, a chain reaction occurs, generating potentially lethal 
radiations. On December 30, 1999, in Tokaimura (Japan), a criticality accident occurred 
at the JCO nuclear fuel processing plant, causing the death of two workers. The 
immediate cause of the accident was the pouring of approximately 15kg of uranium into 
a precipitation tank, a procedure requiring mass and volume control (unless otherwise 
stated, the material in this section is from Furuta et al. (2000)). 
The workers’ task was to process seven batches of uranium in order to produce a 
uranium solution. The tank required to process this solution is called a buffer column. Its 
dimensions were 17.5 cm in diameter and 2.2 m high, owing to criticality safe geometry. 
The inside of this tank was known to be difficult to cleanse. In addition, the bottom of 
the column was located only 10 cm above the floor, causing the uranium solution to be 
difficult to collect. Thus, workers illegally opted for using another tank called 
precipitation tank (see Figure 1). This tank was 50 cm in diameter, 70 cm in depth and 
situated 1 m above the floor. Moreover, it was equipped with a stir propeller making it 
easier to use for homogenising the uranium solution. 
 
Figure 1: The precipitation tank at the JCO plant. 
The workers thought it was not unsafe to pour the seven batches in the precipitation 
tank. This error caused the accident but the latter was rooted in a complex combination 
of deviant organisational practices. Among these featured the pressures from the 
managerial team to increase the production without enough regard to safety implications 
and crew training. This policy impacted on the safety culture developed by the workers, 
providing them with excessive liberty, even for critical procedures. The crews’ practices 
were embedded in a work context where routine violations were constantly approved, 
leading to the implementation of what Westrum (2000) calls a pathological safety culture. 
Previous successful attempts at reducing the cycle time led uncontrolled actions to 
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become the norm at JCO (Blackman et al., 2000). These management issues are discussed 
extensively in Furuta et al. (2000). 
 
The JCO criticality accident was caused by a management-enabled violation being 
coupled with the operators’ erroneous processing of uranium batches above the critical 
mass. This coupling of a violation with an error has been identified by Reason (1990) as a 
very powerful generator of accidents. Although the causes of this accident, as they are 
rooted at the managerial level, call for an analysis at the system level (Bieder, 2000), we 
suggest a complementary individual cognitive approach highlighting the role of 
violations. 
In case of inappropriate use, precipitation tanks have already proven to be dangerous 
(Paxton, Baker & Reider, 1959). In using this tank for producing so much of the uranium 
solution, the crews have a) inaccurately assessed the situation, b) developed a flawed set 
of actions and c) ignored the consequences of such actions. These three components 
have been identified as important features in the control of dynamic systems (Sundstrom, 
1993). In disregarding them, the crews have implemented what Marsden and Hollnagel 
(1996) have qualified as opportunistic control. But we must also acknowledge, after 
Wagenaar (1987), that accidents are not necessarily caused by humans gambling and 
losing. Accidents occur because people do not believe that the ongoing scenario is at all 
possible.  
We would now like to point out that humans often operate illegal configurations of their 
work environment or procedures. In the case of the JCO plant, the workers used an 
illegal tank because the one they were supposed to use (the buffer column) could not 
help them respond to the production pressure from the managers. This sort of 
adaptation, orientated towards easing the work regardless of safety is very common and 
obeys an implicit rule of least effort to accomplish a given task. Having said that, the 
critical violations involved in accidents rarely happen instantly. They often are a sum of 
incremental departures from the prescribed practice. They initially take the form of a 
slight reconfiguration that eases the work and that is found acceptable by the operators. 
Modifications are then progressively added to the tools or practice, each increment being 
assessed as acceptable per se. After years of such progressive violations, the work settings 
can happen to be far beyond the prescribed practice. As Mancini (1987) asserts, large-
scale accidents are made of a concatenation of small failures. 
 
With this JCO case, we wish to highlight the workarounds that operators often 
implement in order to perform daily actions in a less constrained manner (see Gasser, 
1986). This can be achieved in a wild manner and depending on the level of awareness, 
getting the work done sometimes overrides safety concerns. However, violations must 
not be considered as exceptional actions. They are extremely common practices aimed at 
saving time and/or effort in performing a given task. They can be seen as shortcuts that 
bypass some of the steps required by the procedures. They are also one of the features of 
the cognitive flexibility that allow humans to solve unexpected problems. When the 
consequences of one’s actions are anticipated, violations can help implementing ad hoc set 
of actions allowing people to cope efficiently with exceptional situations. This issue will 
be addressed in the next section. 
3.2 Desirable violations: The Sioux City emergency landing 
On July 19, 1989, United Airlines flight 232 bound for Denver crash-landed at Sioux City 
Airport, Iowa. One hundred and twelve people were killed and 184 survived. The aircraft 
was forced to land after a metallurgical defect in the fan disc of the tail-mounted engine 
(#2) caused its catastrophic disintegration. The severity of this failure was such that the 
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engine’s accessory drive system was destroyed, which resulted in a loss of hydraulic 
control. In addition, 70 pieces of shrapnel damaged the lines of the #1 and #3 engines 
(see Figure 2), resulting in a complete loss of hydraulic control. At the time of the 
accident, the loss of all three, independent hydraulic systems was considered a billion to 
one chance (unless otherwise stated, the material in this section is from NTSB (1990) and 
from Captain Haynes, pilot on the United Airlines flight 232 (Haynes, 1991)). 
 
Figure 2: The damaged tail of the DC-10 (adapted from NTSB, 1990). 
The damage to the hydraulic lines resulted in the crew having no control over ailerons, 
rudder, elevators, flaps, slats, spoilers, or steering and braking of the wheels. The only 
control which the crew had was over the throttle controls of the two, wing-mounted 
engines. By varying these throttle controls, they were able, to a certain extent, to control 
the aircraft. However, as revealed by the radar plot diagram (see Figure 3), the control 
over the vertical and horizontal axes were dramatically impaired. For instance, in order to 
correct a bank and stop the aircraft turning onto its back, they had to cut one throttle 
completely and increase the other. In addition to this problem, the crew also had to react 
to phugoids, i.e. oscillations in the vertical flight path whereby the aircraft repeatedly 
climbs and dives in association with fluctuations of speed. This was brought about as 
cutting the power to turn the aircraft caused the speed to drop. In turn, this caused the 
nose to drop and the aircraft to dive. The crew had to attempt to control this oscillation 
throughout the 41 minutes between the engine failure and the crash-landing. They 
needed to cut the throttles when the aircraft was climbing and approaching a stall (as 
increasing the throttles would cause the nose to raise further still). The crew also had to 
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increase the throttles when the aircraft began to dive (to increase the speed and bring the 
nose up). As both the pilot and the co-pilot were struggling with the yoke, they could not 
control the throttles. It is usually possible to control all three throttles with one hand. 
However, as the #2 engine had been destroyed, its throttle lever was locked and the 
remaining two levers, on either side of the jammed lever, had to be controlled with one 
hand each. Fortunately, another DC10 pilot was onboard as a passenger and was brought 
to the cockpit. This second pilot could then control the throttles allowing the pilot and 
co-pilot to control the yoke and the co-pilot to maintain communication with the 
ground. This is, understandably not common flying practice and several flying 
procedures were obviously violated on this flight. 
 
 
Figure 3: Radar plot diagram (NTSB, 1990). 
 
By performing these violations, the crew were able to reach the airport –where the rescue 
teams where on standby- and save so many lives. It is unfortunate that the DC10 was on 
a ‘down’ phase of the phugoid when it landed as this resulted in the impact force being 
much greater. Nevertheless, this event exhibits the neutral nature of violations. These can 
be beneficial to system safety when they are coupled with a valid mental model. They 
allow operators to implement ad hoc control modes and to some extent, cope with 
unknown configurations. 
In section  2.1, we have seen that mental models partially reflect the knowledge operators 
have of a system and are refined through a selection of environmental data. In this crash-
landing case, the pilots used their knowledge of the aircraft’s hardware to make the data 
displayed by the instruments converge towards a sensible representation of the situation. 
Updating a mental model is a crucial step in this kind of diagnosis-like activity and it can 
be flawed even among expert operators. This has been experimentally demonstrated 
among mechanics and electronics operators (Besnard, 2000; Besnard & Cacitti, 2001) 
and has been the cause of other air crashes (NTSB, 1997; METT, 1993). So it is fair to 
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say that the pilots of the DC-10 achieved a high level of performance. In comparison to 
the JCO operators, the pilots developed a more anticipative mode of control coupled 
with a more global and more functional view of the situation (Cellier, Eyrolle & Mariné, 
1997). 
Another contributing factor in the relative success of this crash-landing probably relies 
on the mental model sharing that the pilots established. This component of distributed 
decision taking (see Hollan, Hutchins & Kirsh, 2000) is a core activity in flight tasks 
(Doireau, Wioland & Amalberti, 1997). The transcripts of the dialogues inside the 
cockpit reveal at least two instances of such a distribution: 
 
At 1552:34, the controller asked how steep a right turn the flight could make. The captain responded 
that they were trying to make a 30° bank. A cockpit crewmember commented, “I can't handle that steep 
of bank ...can't handle that steep of bank." (NTSB, 1990, p 22). 
 
At 1559:58, the captain stated "close the throttles." At 1600:01, the check airman stated "nah I can't 
pull'em off or we'll lose it that's what's turnin' ya." (NTSB, 1990, p 23). 
 
These two transcripts show that the pilots have a shared understanding of the situation. 
Each operator interprets the statements of the captain with regards to the limits of the 
controls that this pilot is acting upon. The decisions are shared among the crew members 
and the mental model that is supporting the piloting activity is composed of the 
knowledge of several agents. Indeed, at this time, United Airlines were advocating a 
policy whereby flight crews were encouraged to share information and opinions and not 
merely obey the captain without question. Finally, contrary to the JCO operators, the 
pilots understood very accurately the consequences of their actions although they were 
under strong time pressure. In the last extract of the transcripts, 18 seconds before 
touchdown, the captain asks for the throttles to be closed. This is the normal practice for 
landing a plane and this statement was probably released as a side effect of a rule-based 
behaviour. Interestingly enough, the operator controlling the throttles rejected the 
statement, arguing that the throttles were steering the aircraft. This is an example of a 
safe violation supported by a valid mental model. By implementing an action contrary to 
the usual procedure, one can nevertheless keep an already degraded system’s state in 
reasonably safe boundaries. 
 
The pilots’ accurate mental model has led them to define viable boundaries for possible 
actions and allowed them to restore some form of control on the trajectory under strong 
time pressure and high risks. Controlling the aircraft on the basis of such a model 
afforded the implementation of positive desirable violations. The latter, although situated 
against the procedures, nevertheless exhibited a high degree of relevance.  
4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SAFETY OF SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS 
One may object that JCO and the landing at Sioux City are different on too many 
dimensions to be compared to one another. For instance, JCO is an organisational failure 
leading to a routine violation whereas the Sioux City landing is a material failure leading 
to an exceptional violation. This makes two dimensions to consider, namely 
organisational vs. material and routine vs. exception handling. 
• As far as the organisational vs. material dimension of the cases is concerned, if 
one a) has an accurate knowledge about the task at hand, b) has enough 
information available, c) and processes this information accurately, there are very 
few reasons why violations should be hazardous. Anticipating the correct future 
system’s state is what matters. Whether or not crews are following the rules is of 
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little concern. This applies to the two cases we have considered. It is obvious for 
the Sioux city landing. But even at JCO where the managerial laissez-faire was a 
significant factor, knowing what kind of mistake they were about to make would 
have saved the operators.  
• Let us now consider the routine vs. exception handling. The settings in which the 
operators were working at JCO were routine ones. The plant had run several 
production campaigns in the past and uranium solution production was just one 
of the services offered by the company. On the other hand, the conditions in 
which the DC-10 had to be landed were quite remote from nominal ones due to 
the many hydraulic systems’ failures and the reconfigurations needed to continue 
the flight. Despite this difference in nature, the two cases remain comparable as 
far as the cognitive processes are concerned: The representation of the process at 
hand and the understanding of the consequences of actions were a matter of 
accident or (relative) success. 
If one accepts to consider JCO and the Sioux City landing under the angle that we have 
adopted in this paper (i.e. the link between valid mental models and successful 
violations), it then seems acceptable to treat these two cases as comparable, despite their 
differences in location, time, technology, etc. In this respect, we believe that the mental 
processes involved in these two cases are relatively context-independent. 
 
As Van der Schaaf (1992, quoted by Rauterberg, 1995) puts it, when an unexpected 
configuration restores or enhances the reliability level, then this positive system’s state 
must be analysed to improve the functioning of the system. This is the spirit of this 
paper, supported by the example of the DC-10 crash-landing. And inevitably, in the 
context of this research, violations per se are not considered as harmful. Exceptions to 
this statement exist, e.g. in a system considered to be lost and upon which one performs 
a command or action whose consequences are not known, assuming that the system’s 
state cannot be worse anyway. But we nonetheless believe that what is harmful is an 
action, legal or not, carried out without a full understanding of its consequences. So 
when discussing the impact of violations on systems safety, one has to take into account 
the mental model that operators hold. The two case studies exposed in this paper are two 
opposite instances of this argument.  
 
We obviously accept the idea that many lives are saved thanks to pilots and operators 
correctly applying well-designed procedures for known emergency situations. This safety 
principle relies on experience: procedures account for past occurrences of events that 
have fallen into common knowledge. These procedures then prescribe a series of actions 
designed as an answer to already known conditions. This introduces a bias since high-
pace, highly-critical systems, sometimes exhibit unexpected emergency settings for which 
no procedure exists. These conditions impose such a narrow span of legal actions that 
violating elementary rules is sometimes the only way to control the system. Following 
procedures under nominal, expected emergency conditions is a good interaction 
principle. However, if we think of low-probability, high-risk, unexpected situations, then 
the rules that stand for expected, standard situations may not always apply. 
One lesson that can be learnt from violations in systems is that one should not expect 
humans to always act as prescribed. Procedures themselves do not rule human behaviour 
(Fujita, 2000) and there are many ways in which humans can configure a system and use 
it in unexpected and/or unprotected modes. The motivation for doing so may be based 
on a heuristic evaluation. If the intuitive cost/benefit trade-off in reconfiguring a system 
allows an operator to ease the accomplishment of a task, then it is likely that this 
reconfiguration will be performed, even at the cost of a violation. In this trade-off, 
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factors such as safety culture and risk perception are key notions. And again, whether or 
not the operator has a relevant knowledge of the potential consequences of his/her 
actions is what determines the level of risk involved. 
4.1 A conservative safety culture 
We have seen in section  3.1 that when flawed mental models combine themselves with 
violations, they can lead to serious impairments in safety. We have qualified these 
violations as harmful. As Reason (1990; 2000) and many others have pointed out, the 
existence of such violations is often caused by management flaws that propagate through 
the various layers of an organisation. As a consequence, a front-line operator causing an 
accident must not be regarded as an individual cognitive error but as a wider system 
failure. Even if the latter is not the approach we have adopted in this paper, we have to 
acknowledge that operators are too often blamed for having performed actions that a 
flawed cultural context or a bad management policy made inevitable. The picture may be 
even worse. According to Van der Schaaf (2000), rules in organisations are often 
developed simply to protect management from legal actions. Such alarming issues have 
already been raised by Rame (1995) who asserts that some incidents even lead to data 
obfuscation when human factors are involved. The legal side of enquiries and the 
individual blame policy that still prevail in the western European society can be put into 
question as well, especially when they clearly disregard non-individual factors leading to 
accidents (see for instance Svenson, Lekberg & Johansson, 1999). 
4.2 Ad hoc reconfigurations 
In our view, violations are actions that can be interpreted as ad hoc reconfigurations. In 
non-emergency situations, we conceive them as departures from the rules that informally 
express a need for different working practices or tools. But violations also occur in 
emergency situations where they help implementing recovery control modes on a system. 
So a strong warning has to be given to systems designers. If the human agents of a 
system are not able to perform violations, it may reveal that the protections against 
human undesired actions have risen up to the point where the human cognitive flexibility 
cannot be exploited any more. This is probably the kind of situation that inspired 
Bainbridge’s (1983) ironies of automation. She suggests that the more advanced a control 
system, the more critical the role of human agents. This is potentially caused by the 
impossibility, beyond some point, to design perfect automated systems. This 
impossibility implies keeping the human agents inside the control loop in order to cope 
with potential unexpected events (Amalberti, 1996). Including humans in a system 
implies the acceptance of having them interacting with it in a manner that diverges from 
the specifications. Although it induces a risk, it exploits their capacity to handle these 
unexpected events that require ad hoc reconfiguration. This is a function that is extremely 
difficult to implement in machines and is widely accepted as being a typical human skill. 
It is an intriguing fact that we seem to be more prepared to accept these violations when 
they lead to a happy end rather than when they cause an accident. Instead, they should 
be seen as the two facets of the same coin. In the end, as Woods and Shattuck (2000) 
suggest, the design options range from a centralised control inhibiting actors’ adaptation 
to variability, to local actors’ complete autonomy disconnecting the hierarchy from any 
decision taking. Obviously, the final safety of a system will rely on the right balance 
between these two extreme points. 
As far as the actual design is concerned, Woods (1993, quoting his 1986 work) suggests a 
two-fold view. “The tool maker may exhibit intelligence in shaping the potential of the artefact relative 
to a field of practice. The practitioner may exhibit intelligence in tailoring his activity and the artefact to 
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the contingencies of the field of activity given his goals”. This highlights the dual view that one has 
to have about human agents in systems. Some people design tools, others use and 
reshape them so that the latter fit their intentions better, so to speak. This reshaping 
activity by users has been identified by Wimmer, Rizzo & Sujan (1999) as a source of 
valuable data that design teams must try to capture.  
 
Although not all violations are desirable, preventing humans from performing any is not 
the issue. The point is letting them configure the system at the condition that they are 
trained and have enough understanding of the risks associated with their actions (Fujita, 
2000). This correlates with Reasons’ (2000) view about high-reliability organisations: 
Human compensations and adaptations to changing events is one of the most important 
safeguards. In this conception, violations can contribute to make a system safer. If 
operators have sufficient knowledge and available cognitive resources, they can 
implement an anticipative mode of control which is a pre-requisite for a safe interaction 
with dynamic real-time systems. In such conditions, human agents are able to conduct a 
safe ad hoc interaction in the case of e.g. emergency situations that were not expected by 
designers (Cf. section  3.2). Then, the flexibility of the human operator can maintain or 
improve the safety of a given system by enlarging the span of the control that he or she 
has on it. 
4.3 Violations and control modes 
JCO and Sioux City are, to some extent, cases where operators respectively needed to 
reduce production time and gain a higher level of control. This has been achieved by 
transgressing rules and procedures. From a control mode point of view, the JCO routine 
violations might be associated with a skill-based control mode whereas the emergency 
Sioux City landing might have relied on a knowledge-based control mode. The rationale 
for this classification derives from the very routinised job of diluting uranium at JCO, 
and the extremely unlikelihood of landing a plane without hydraulics. From this 
standpoint, routine violations appear to be extremely hazardous since they involve highly 
encapsulated cognitive processes that require very little control. The consequence may be 
to routinely depart from procedure in undetected exceptional settings. This is an already 
documented phenomenon whereby experienced operators (e.g. trouble-shooters; see 
Besnard, 2000) fall into a frequency bias and fail to identify non-routine conditions when 
solving a problem. On the other hand, the violations implemented aboard the DC-10 are 
safer in our opinion, due to the crew being aware that they were in exceptional flying 
conditions.  
Classically, the skill-based control mode has been said to be reliable since it is built from 
the experience gained in a given class of problems. On the other hand, the knowledge-
based control mode has been introduced as a fallible one due to cognitive cost. Although 
the above appears to be true in the vast majority of cases, the two accidents presented in 
this paper provide counter-examples to these assumptions. One explanation could be as 
follows. Although skill-driven violations and knowledge-driven violations trigger the 
same level of hazard, the difference lies in the fact that that expert operators resorting to 
a knowledge-based level of control are doing so as an answer to the recognised 
exceptional nature of the problem at hand. Therefore, it may be that they are more aware 
of the impact of an error and invest more effort into understanding the consequences of 
their acts. Having said this, and as stated in section  3, it is doubtless that counter-
examples exist where routine violations are successful and exceptional violations are 
catastrophic. 
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5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
After Cacciabue and Kjaer-Hansen (1993), we think that a design team designing systems 
interacting with humans should bring together a variety of skills, including engineers, 
computer scientists and psychologists. As this research originates from an 
interdisciplinary research project on dependable computer-based-systems (visit DIRC at 
http://www.dirc.org.uk) the authors are rather sensitive to this kind of argument and will 
make the following recommendations rely on this principle. 
 
Within the scope of this paper, we do not believe that humans are deterministic agents. 
If they indeed are, it then seems reasonable to say that we are not yet able to understand 
the underlying deterministic mechanism. It follows that humans sometimes act in ways 
that are beyond our prediction power. We must therefore design the workplace as a 
whole accordingly and expect humans to adopt unanticipated configurations of the 
system, including its tools and procedures. In this paper, we have defended the idea that 
whether a violation increases the control over a given task depends on the extent to 
which the operator’s mental model accurately reflects and predicts the system’s present 
and future states of the process. This defines two potential areas for improvements: the 
rationale for the initial violation and the content of the mental model itself. The two 
following recommendations address these issues. 
5.1 Design workable instead of exhaustive procedures 
Organisations must understand the reasons behind the gap between procedures and 
practice (Dekker, 2003). From this standpoint, errors that are coupled with violations 
must not always be interpreted as incompetence (Rizzo, Ferrante & Bagnara, 1995). 
Instead, they sometimes highlight the need for improvements such as more workable 
procedures. Wishing to design perfect and exhaustive procedures is not feasible. If this 
were the case, we could replace human agents with one form of automation or another. 
The reality is that procedures and rules are intrinsically incomplete in the sense that there 
will always be an unforeseen event for which the safety of a system will rely on human 
intervention. Although designing exhaustive rules and procedures can stem from the 
assumption that it will enhance systems’ reliability, the outcome may actually be the 
opposite. Humans will implement workarounds (Gasser, 1986) in order to by-pass rules 
that are too costly to follow or unworkable. In our opinion, a step towards a solution is 
to design more usability-centred rules and procedures i.e. ones for which humans will 
understand the rationale and will conform to. In this respect, the workplace should be 
constrained by and designed according to the way humans think and act, not the other 
way around. Several ways to “do the job” should be supported, accounting for different 
styles and/or levels of expertise. For instance, different types of assistance and protection 
should be provided to the operators, depending on their experience in a given task. 
Ultimately, it is only by designing artefacts and procedures that match the operator’s 
operational objectives and practices (a counter-example is the buffer column at JCO) that 
humans will accept to act within defined boundaries. 
5.2 Operators must have accurate mental models, not only rules to follow 
When hazardous unanticipated events arise, the human agent is the last barrier before the 
accident. It is therefore eminently important that operators could hold a representation 
of the system’s behaviour which is compatible with what is actually happening. This is 
where mental models impact safety. The JCO case shows that violations alone are not 
the problem. The coupling of the latter with a flawed mental model is the problem since 
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it prevents the operator from understanding the current state of the system, therefore 
degrading the anticipation of future events. In this context, improving the accuracy of 
mental models is mandatory. It implies that a) adequate education is given to the 
operator through e.g. training schemes, and that b) the system provides a realistic, 
workable picture of its behaviour. This second point seems of high relevance to the 
reliability of human-automation interaction and is specifically targeted to systems 
designers. One difficulty that the JCO operators were faced with is the lack of visibility 
of the critical state the system had entered. So one suggestion is to create systems whose 
complexity can be made compatible with some form of transparency. For instance, 
systems with short delays of feedback and that display tangible changes in state may 
improve the representation that operators have of the behaviour of this system. The fact 
that the degraded behaviour of the DC-10 was obvious to the pilots helped them to 
adopt the right control mode. 
The next generation of support tools should be anticipative by nature. As suggested by 
Kanno et al. (2003), they should be pro-actively driven by the dialogue between the 
operator and the system instead of being reactively displaying information on request. 
This line of thought is addressed in the next section 
6 A LOOK FORWARD: ANTICIPATIVE SYSTEMS NEEDED 
Hollnagel and Woods (1999) assert that the goal of designing a man-machine system 
should be that of making the interaction between the operator and the system as smooth 
and efficient as the interaction between two persons. An essential part of human 
communication is that each participant is able to continuously anticipate and modify his 
or her model of the other. So after Amalberti’s (1992) concerns, we think machines 
should account for human operators’ context dependency. There may be enough 
knowledge in ergonomics and enough computational resources available in modern 
control systems to allow the implementation of screening functions dedicated to analyse 
human actions (as already suggested by Rasmussen, 1991). Such screening functions 
could lead to e.g. the building and loading of a cognitive profile of the various users of 
the system. This kind of assistance tool would dynamically and specifically support a 
given operators’ reasoning, provide synthetic shots on the system’s state, anticipate which 
action is now required, which information will be needed next, etc. Also, we believe the 
next generation of support tools should be able to provide a) assistance for unexpected 
emergency situations as well as b) anticipative protection measures for acts identified as 
hazardous. This last point may be a way to foresee human-machine interaction flaws 
such as mode confusion (Crow, Javaux & Rushby, 2000; Leveson et al., 1997; Rushby 
2001; Rushby, Crow & Palmer, 1999) by predicting mismatches between the operator’s 
mental model and the system’s state.  
Operators need more help on exceptional situations for which they have not been 
trained rather than on nominal settings. However ambitious it may seem, this vision of 
the world is just one where classical ideas are stretched beyond our current knowledge. 
According to Cacciabue (1991) and Hollnagel (1987), tools should fully support human 
decision making and improve system’s safety. The future reliability of the interaction 
between human agents and critical systems may depend on how far we succeed in 
extending this kind of principles and how diverse are the systems in which we can turn 
these principles into a tangible design policy. 
7 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, after recalling some views on the contribution of human agents to system 
safety, we have been concerned with violations and the way they impact on systems. We 
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have defended the idea that violations per se do not explain the occurrence of accidents. 
The accuracy of operators’ mental models is a key factor. To support our claim, we have 
exploited the Tokaimura criticality accident and the Sioux City crash-landing cases. Our 
analysis revealed that violations can generate very different outcomes depending on 
whether they are coupled with valid or invalid representations of reality. Therefore, we 
believe that violations cannot be assessed without taking into account the level of 
understanding of the operators. As a consequence, violations should be supported rather 
than prevented as they are a real opportunity for human operators to recover from 
degraded situations. As improvements to socio-technical systems’ dependability, we 
recommend that a) rules and procedures should not aim at being exhaustive but rather 
workable, and that b) training associated to system’s transparency can improve the 
validity of mental models. Lastly, we believe that the next generation of support tools 
should be anticipative. In this respect, it is obvious to us that multiple disciplines (e.g. 
ergonomics, cognitive psychology, computer science, engineering) are required in design 
teams if we want humans’ cognitive abilities to be supported in unexpected, critical 
conditions. 
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